The Role of the Nigerian State in the Management of Oil-related Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

The Role of the Nigerian State in the Management of Oil-related Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

Aim and Objectives of the Study: This study aims to evaluate the role of the Nigerian state in the management of oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

Specific objectives are to:

1. Examine the intervention strategies adopted by the Nigerian State and MNCs
2. Analyze the consequences of the intervention strategies on the MNCs and Host communities’ relations.
3. Evaluate the dominant conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian state.
4. Assess the responses and coping strategies communities adopt to use force.
5. Examine the implication of using force for development in the Niger Delta Region.
   CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

    1.1     Background to the Study

   The activities of oil multinationals with a large investment have provoked discourses on Multinational Corporations. Including their mode of operation, and contributions to the creation of discontent among host communities in their business environment.

   Crude oil and its extractions give rise to a crisis of development. It exposes regional and national competitions for resources. They manifest themselves in the struggle for resource control and the festering issues of economic and social injustice. (Commoner, 1976; Yergin, 2010).

   Discourses on the operation of multinational corporations (MNCs) include the impact of Multinationals on the environment. Also their responsibilities, socio-economic displacement, and neglect of the communities within the operating areas.

   Multinational corporations have also been accused of penetrating the socio-economic and political fabrics of host communities. Including the states in a bid to control and dominate the system to their advantage.

   The penetration of the local communities is made possible through the intervention, collaboration, and partnership of the government. This will create “order” for peaceful coexistence between the multinationals and the local people in areas where they operate.

   The role of the state in “creating order” in society is generally agreed upon by all no matter the ideological standpoint of individuals (Ekekwe, 1986).

   What is arguable, however, in whose interest the order created serves. The liberal perspective sees the state as neutral, trying to balance things out between contending groups (Ekekwe, 1986).

   However, the Government, especially of the less developed countries are seen as weakened “from above” by the oil multinationals and their Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), “from below”. It faces the decentering local resistance of the informal economy, ethnic nationalism, and grass root activism (Smith et al, 1998).

   The quest for FDI at the national level trumps the aspirations of local communities even more so as the local communities do not influence the decisions/policy-making process.

   The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria is an area that has over the years experienced conflicts. This is a result of contentions between oil multinational corporations, government, and host communities.

   The occurrence of the contentions and discontents can be traced to the pre-independence period. This is when oil was first discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 at Oloibiri, in present-day Bayelsa State.

   Ever since the region has played host to several oil companies that have over time led to the generation of huge revenue from oil. Has over six hundred (600) oil fields and four hundred (400) oil production and facilities for storage across the region (Osah, 2016).

   Notwithstanding the enormous revenue generated from oil, not much has been done in the region. That is, oil and gas are explored. Instead, the region is replete with conflicts between host communities and oil multinational corporations amidst underdevelopment.

   Conflict in the Niger Delta region is an outcome of dislocated survival strategies of the two groups. This includes– the local communities and the multinational corporations – trying to adjust to a socio-economic environment (Bennette, 2014).

   The new social environment, which now accommodates two incompatible aspirations of the host communities and the multinationals, depends strongly on the level of compatibility and the management of the aspirations of both parties.

   In the context where options are available to satisfy the desires of both parties, there will be no conflict. However, where there is conflict as a result of the inability of both parties to meet their aspirations, the multinationals resort to other means of getting their desires accomplished.

   The Nigerian government’s poor handling of the contending issues between the MNCs and the local people led to the escalation of conflicts in the Niger Delta region. It demonstrates the poverty of governmental power which can best be described within the context of this study as the inability to perform expected governmental functions which is a requisite for the welfare of the citizenry. It is instructive to state that the government has not displayed a positive use of power. This is required for the coordination of activities between the host communities and the oil companies to achieve the desired peace in the region. But rather has adopted a brute force regime through military engagement as a means of managing the conflict.

   According to Ekekwe (1986), the state in maintaining order, should not usually or simply apply brute force. Instead should apply propaganda and ideological hegemony to gain legitimacy through ameliorating systems in a bid to keep the use of force in the background.

   In the Niger Delta, the predominant form of conflict management has been the use of force through the military. This is referred to as Joint Task Force, JTF by the multinationals and through their joint venture partner (the government).

   According to Eweje (2015), this begs the question of why cognizance cannot be given to all the stakeholders in production locations instead of the inadequate response of the government to the poor living conditions of the people as is the case with the people of the Niger Delta Region.

   The Nigerian government’s attempt to meet the aspirations of the Niger Delta people has always come as a response to some form of agitation and resistance by the people from the region. This has always been in the form of tokenism and has remained inadequate. This has in turn fueled further agitation by the people, thus exacerbating the level of conflict to which the government has responded through military feud. Evidenced in the increased number of military hardware, equipment, and personnel in the region. As the military presence increased in the region so also is the intensity and the fierceness of the conflicts due to reprisals from the communities and militant groups.

   It is against these failures that the conflicts between host communities and the multinationals, and the government became intense and posed serious threats to the survival of the Nigerian State (Owugah, 2010).  However, the strategy of using force as a conflict management strategy by the government and multinationals has not been able to yield the expected outcome. This work attempts to interrogate the use of force as a mechanism for managing conflict in the Niger Delta Region.

   1.2 Statement of the Problem

   Analysis of the Niger Delta crisis abounds and is recurrent. The discussions range from environmental pollution, displacement, economic strangulation, and lack of infrastructural development to deprivation, amongst others. The majority of the works on the conflicts in the Niger Delta Region have focused attention on the nature and courses of the conflict (Okoko, 1996; Nna, 1999; Ibaba, 2012). This work goes beyond looking at the nature and courses of the conflict by focusing attention on the character of conflict management.

   The system of managing conflict through the use of power (brute force) like the use of military and other paramilitaries (Joint Task Force) to suppress recurrent conflict can no longer contain protracted conflicts.

   Different brute force regimes like the “Hit Hard” model, emanating from the strategic theory that if you hit hard enough, the opponent will decide after some time that it is not worth going on and submits to outcomes that are less favorable (De Reuck, 1996) can no longer be adequate in managing conflict, at least in the case of the Niger Delta Region.

   Determining how hard you can hit the opponent to force submission is vital. As in some cases like that of the Niger Delta, the harder you hit, the more annoyed or desperate the people become. How hard you hit cannot be of infinite proportion according to De Reuck (1996) to the suppression of any audible voice or potentially audible voice capable of formatting opposition to an organization or governmental systems.

   The experience of Nigeria is common knowledge and it has been associated with authoritarian, historically military dictatorship (Eweje, 2006).

   These authoritarian regimes have features of not giving room for negotiation and completely silencing opponents by maiming and killing with little respect for human rights. This was the case when the Playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight others were hanged in 1995 in a bid to serve as deterrence and to silence the opposition to Shell Petroleum Development Company’s poor standard of operation, poor environmental management practices, and deprivation of the Ogoni people (Mitee, 2011).

   Also in Brass, Bayelsa State, in April of 2000, at the gate of the Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) base, some community members protested against environmental degradation, neglect, and non-inclusion in the employment of unskilled jobs. The response of the government and that of the company was to invite the military. Three members were shot and many more were injured. This was a way to force the community people to submit.

   The brute force regime negates the “iron law of responsibility” which states that when society grants legitimacy and power to corporations, in the long run, those who do not use power in a manner that society considers responsible will tend to lose it (Freeman, 2010). The outcome ever since has been distrust, discontent, and conflicts.

   There was also the shutting down of a flow station at Nembe Creek in 2011. This was done by the indigenous people of Nembe in Bayelsa State. As a result of irreconcilable differences, viz pollution, non-payment of compensation, and non-provision of social amenities.

   The immediate response of Shell and the government was to move the military into the area. This was to ensure that production of the much-needed crude continued. Regardless of its concomitant effect of pollution and degradation with little concern for the people living around the operating area.

   The outcome has been protracted conflict between the host communities and the oil company. Just like the many other locations where oil is produced in the Niger Delta.

   The response of the oil MNCs and the Government is the subjugation of the local people by using the military.

   On the part of the host communities, it has been agitations that culminated in the disruption of operations, seizures, and hostage-taking (Hamilton, 2011). The role of the state as it relates to the conflict between host communities and oil MNCs should be one of moderating the crises. Instead, the State has consistently served as a tool in the hands of the economic giants to suppress and oppress the less powerful economically displaced people of the oil-bearing communities.

   Hamilton (2011) argues that the state has escalated community/oil companies’ crises as it has not given the needs of the people a proper consideration in their operations. Instead, the Nigerian state would rather be in pari passu with the MNCs to suppress any form of an uprising that might disrupt the flow of operation. And continues oil exploration and exploitation.

   After a series of feuds in the Niger Delta Region, the pitting of the military against oil-producing communities became more intensified and formalized. Especially when a meeting was held in Kaiama in Bayelsa State on the 11^th of December, 1998 by youths of Ijaw descent. They formed the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and came up with a communiqué referred to as the Kaiama Declaration.

   The assertions of the declaration emphasized the struggle for resource control – the right to benefit from resources within the confines of their land. And also issues on environmental degradation and the right to participation and consent on all laws enacted that affect the Niger Delta people and their lands (www.humanrightwatch, 1999).

   In line with the assertions, the IYC further called for the complete withdrawal of the military forces from the Niger Delta Region. It declared that all oil companies using the military as a shield (for the protection of their operation) would be considered an enemy.

   On the 28^th of December, 1998, the IYC announced the launch of ‘Operation Climate Change’ aimed at some of the activities of the oil multinationals. Including the gas flares. Subsequently, demonstrations were held in different host communities and the military responded heavy-handedly. This led to the death of dozens of youths and a few soldiers in Yenagoa and other host communities. (www.unitedijaw.com, 2017).

   According to an ethnic-based newspaper Urobotoday of 21^st June 2016, it will be correct to say that the different crops of militants – the Avengers, like their predecessors, are acting out twisted versions of the Kaiama Script.

   The concomitant effect is the proliferation of militant/cult groups. Including the Egbesu, Icelanders, Debam, Dewel, Greenlanders, Songu-furo, etcetera. Some other groups in different guises also got involved with criminality. Including kidnapping, murder, stealing, and outright glorification of criminals as street ‘Generals”.

   The Niger Delta Region turned out to be a full conflict and violence-prone zone. The reaction of the government and MNCs to keep the crude oil flowing was to further militarize the region. Using the brute force. This in turn increased resistance and tensions among the MNCs, Government, and the host communities.

   Consequently, more military presence has resulted in more militants and more violence in the Niger Delta Region.     

   The Multinationals on their part, adopt the “divide and rule strategy”. Where they favorably deal with a particular community or people. Then, they pitch them against the others.

   The MNCs in a bid to shift attention from their activities might resort to engaging in some form of corporate social responsibility. They do this by providing negligible infrastructure in a particular community in exclusion of other nearby communities. Also, when the need to pay compensations arises, a select community would be paid. Then, a generalized statement is made to appear as if the payment is made to all communities in the vicinity.

   The divide and rule tactic done through proper profiling is a major causal factor of intra-communal conflict in host communities. An example is the recurrent conflicts amongst the Twon, Ewoama, and Okpoama communities of Brass Island in Bayelsa. Where Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) operates its biggest terminal since 1972. It manipulates the peaceful Brass communities to its favor. While the communities are in abject poverty and a constant state of intra-communal conflict.

   Ideally, oil multinationals and their joint venture partners, as is the case in Nigeria, ought to be environmentally sensitive. They should be aware of all related issues in the production area. Having a strong empathy for the communities who are impacted by the exploration/production activities.

   Giving full recognition to the communities as the primary stakeholders. Have them benefit from value creation and predetermined lines of communication with the MNCs. All these are requisite for managing differences that might lead to frictions and outright conflict(s).

   This work looks at the efficacy and limitations of the use of the military and its brute force. As it concerns the management of oil-related conflict between multinationals and host communities. It has become a serious challenge being faced by the host communities. As those opposed to the interests, policies, and activities of the oil multinationals and governments are often arrested and detained. While some lost their lives.

   Although the sources of the crisis are multidimensional, the most prominent is the “historical failure” of government. (Oviasuji & Uwadiae (2010). In all its power, it has not been able to properly manage the conflicts in the region.

   The aforementioned instances portray the poverty of power in the management of the crisis over the years. Thus, there is a need to address them holistically. If the region and its inhabitants would experience a peaceful cordial relationship with the government and MNCs in the area.

   1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

   This study aims to evaluate the role of the Nigerian state in the management of oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.

   Specific objectives are to:

   1. Examine the intervention strategies adopted by the Nigerian State and MNCs
   2. Analyze the consequences of the intervention strategies on the MNCs and Host communities’ relations.
   3. Evaluate the dominant conflict management strategies adopted by the Nigerian state.
   4. Assess the responses and coping strategies adopted by communities to the use of force
   5. Examine the implication of using force for development in the Niger Delta Region.

   1.4 Research Questions

   This study, therefore, seeks to answer the following research questions;

   1. What are the intervention strategies adopted by the state and multinationals?
   2. What are the consequences of the intervention strategies for MNCs and host communities?
   3. What are the dominant conflict management strategies adopted by the State and MNCs?
   4. How have communities responded to or coped with the use of force in the Niger Delta?
   5. How have the conflict management strategies impacted the development of the Niger Delta Region?

   1.5 Research Hypotheses

   This study was guided by the following hypotheses;

   1. The more effective intervention strategies adopted by the state and MNCs, the more the conflict will be minimized.
   2. The more selective the intervention strategies, the more consequences the state and MNCs would experience in resolving the conflict.
   3. The more challenges encountered in the implementation/maintenance of peace between MNCs and host communities, the less the conflict will be resolved.
   4. The less the military approach is adopted in resolving oil-related conflict, the more the conflict will be resolved.
   5. The more force is used in solving the oil-related conflict, the less the host communities will be satisfied. Especially with the maintenance of peace in the Niger Delta.

   1.6 Significance of the Study

   This study will be significant in several ways. The Nigerian state, oil MNCs, and the host communities are all losing from the protracted conflicts. This study would serve as a framework for policymakers to rethink the system of managing oil-related conflict. It would draw inference from its findings and recommendation to make the finest decision. This will help to resolve the conflicts in the area.

   Theoretically, this study will contribute to an existing body of knowledge on the subject. It will bring to the fore, the shortcomings of the present systems of conflict management. Concerning host communities and multinationals. It will expose the strength and weaknesses of the different approaches adopted. Especially for the resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta region, including the agitations for resource control.

   Importantly, it will serve the interest of the general public readership and particularly, students of conflict studies. It will help them understand the management approaches especially as it pertains to oil-related conflicts.

   
    

   1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

   The scope of this study will cover the management of oil-related conflicts by the Nigerian State and Multinationals. This centers on the Niger Delta Area, between, 2003-2018. Three States – Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers State were chosen. As the occurrence of conflicts is more in these States.  Limitations were experienced because the topography of the area and insecurity did not allow free travel. The Multinationals and the military men too were not willing to freely share information.